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 Abstract 
 
 The roles of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have become increasingly controversial in the 
modern world of residential mortgage finance.  We describe the special features of these two 
companies and their roles in the mortgage markets.  We then discuss the controversies that surround 
them and offer recommendations for improvements in public policy. 
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 The Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation  – commonly known as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, respectively1 -- have led the way 
in dramatic changes that have taken place in the structure of the U.S. residential mortgage markets 
since the 1970s. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are quasi-private/quasi-public: for example, they 
have federal charters that confer unique regulatory provisions; but their shares are publicly traded on 
the New York Stock Exchange. The biggest advantage of Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s 
anomalous legal status arises because financial markets treat their obligations as if those obligations 
are backed by the federal government – even though the federal government explicitly does not do 
so.  With the benefit of this special status, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have grown into enormous 
financial institutions, with combined total assets of over $1.8 trillion in 2003.  One critic, Richard 
Carnell (2004), a former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, has suggested that the two companies’ 
growth is at least partially a consequence of a “double game” that they play:  “[They] tell Congress 
and the news media, ‘Don’t worry, the government is not on the hook’ – and then turn around and 
tell Wall Street, ‘Don’t worry, the government really is on the hook.’” 
 The preferential legal status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac serves as one of a number of 
mechanisms by which the federal government encourages the consumption (and, arguably, the over-
consumption) of housing in the U.S. economy – this one with an on-budget cost of zero. But 
economists are congenitally suspicious of programs that seem to offer something for nothing. After 
all, a federal guarantee of the deposits in savings and loans cost nothing for many decades -- until 
the early 1990s, when it cost taxpayers about $150 billion (U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, 1997). Furthermore, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan (2004), among others, 
                                                 
1 The nicknames “Fannie Mae” and “Freddie Mac” originated among securities traders, and the two companies are now 
far better known by these names than by their formal corporate titles. 
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has suggested that the anomalous situation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may even pose systemic 
risks to the financial sector. 
 This article will offer a generalist's guide to the functions that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
perform in the residential mortgage financial markets and the controversies that swirl around them.  
Along the way we will highlight some important -- and perhaps under-appreciated -- changes that 
are occurring in the structure of U.S. residential mortgage markets. 
 
Some Background 
 
 What Do Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Do? 
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac participate in the secondary mortgage market: Mortgage 
originators come to them with pools (bundles) of mortgages and either swap these assets for 
securities or sell them outright to one of the two companies.  Under Fannie Mae’s and Freddie 
Mac’s “swap programs,” an originator exchanges a mortgage pool for a mortgage-backed security 
that is issued and guaranteed by one of the two companies and that represents an interest in the same 
pool.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac promise the security holders that the latter will receive timely 
payment of interest and principal on the underlying mortgages, less an annual "guarantee fee” of 
about 20 basis points (0.20 percent) on the remaining principal.  In essence, Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac are providing insurance to holders of mortgage-backed securities against default risk on the 
underlying mortgages and are thus bearing that risk themselves.  This securitization activity 
illustrates one of their two core businesses: mortgage credit guarantees. 
 The other core business of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is their investment portfolios.  
These portfolios consist largely of mortgage-backed securities that they have purchased in the open 
market, as well as mortgages that they purchase from originators under their “cash programs.”  
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Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac fund these assets largely by issuing debt, as the two companies are 
highly leveraged with total equity that is less than 4 percent of total assets. 
 The major differences between Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are in their historical roots. 
The National Housing Act of 1934 created the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) and also provided 
for chartering national mortgage associations as entities within the federal government.  The only 
association ever formed was the National Mortgage Association of Washington in 1938, which 
eventually became the Federal National Mortgage Association – now Fannie Mae.  By issuing debt 
and purchasing and holding FHA-insured residential mortgages from “mortgage banks,” Fannie 
Mae was able to expand the available pool of finance to support housing and also to provide a 
degree of unification to mortgage markets.  During this time, mortgage markets were localized for 
technological reasons, as well as for reasons rooted in laws that prohibited interstate banking and 
restricted intra-state bank branches in many states during most of the twentieth century.  
 In 1968, Fannie Mae was converted into a private corporation, with publicly traded shares 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange, although it retained a unique federal charter that is 
discussed further below. Apparently one major reason for the privatization was that until 1968 
Fannie Mae's debt was part of the federal debt; but when Fannie Mae became a publicly traded 
company, that debt (which stayed with the company) was removed from the national debt total.  
Fannie Mae was replaced within the federal government by the Government National Mortgage 
Association (which became known as “Ginnie Mae”), an agency within the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) that guarantees mortgage-backed securities that have as their 
underlying assets residential mortgages that are insured primarily by the FHA or by the Department 
of Veterans Affairs (formerly the Veterans Administration, or VA).  
 Freddie Mac, by contrast, was created by Congress in 1970 to support mortgage markets by 
securitizing mortgages originated by savings and loan associations (S&Ls).  During the 1970s and 
1980s, Freddie Mac was technically a private company, with its equity shares held solely by the 
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twelve Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) and by S&Ls that were members of the FHLBs.  
Freddie Mac’s board of directors consisted of the three board members of the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Board, which regulated the S&L industry during that time.  Freddie Mac was converted in 
1989 into a publicly traded company, also traded on the New York Stock Exchange, with the same 
special features as apply to Fannie Mae. A major motivation for the conversion of Freddie Mac to a 
publicly traded company was the belief that a wider potential share-holding public would raise the 
price of the shares held by the then ailing S&L industry and thus improve the balance sheets of the 
latter.   
 In its early history, Freddie Mac tended to securitize mortgages, originated largely by S&Ls, 
whereas Fannie Mae tended to hold the mortgages that it bought largely from mortgage banks.  By 
the 1990s, however, the two companies' structures and strategies looked quite similar. 
 
 Current Size 
 As of year-end 2003, Fannie Mae had $1,010 billion in assets and Freddie Mac had $803 
billion in assets, making them the second and third largest U.S. companies, respectively, on this 
basis.  In addition, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had significant quantities of mortgage-backed 
securities outstanding – that is, net of mortgage-backed securities carried on their balance sheets.  
As of year-end 2003, Fannie Mae had $1,300 billion in outstanding mortgage-backed securities 
while Freddie Mac had another $769 billion outstanding. 
 Both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have grown rapidly over the past three decades and at a 
faster clip than the residential mortgage market as a whole.  As Table 1 shows, in 1980 the 
residential mortgage market consisted of $1.1 trillion in obligations, of which Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac held or securitized only $78 billion, or about 7 percent.  By contrast, in 2003, these 
companies held or securitized over $3.6 trillion of the $7.7 trillion in residential mortgage debt, or 
about 47 percent. The U.S. Congressional Budget Office (2001) estimated the involvement of 
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Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in various slices of the mortgage markets as of 2000.  For example, 
for fixed-rate single-family mortgages that were eligible to be purchased or securitized by the two 
companies (about half of the total residential mortgage market), the two companies accounted for 71 
percent of that slice (through either their securitizations or their portfolio holdings). 
 
 Special Features of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac differ from other U.S. corporations in that they were created 
by Congress and maintain exclusive federal charters.  These charters, in turn, confer a number of 
rights and responsibilities on these companies (U.S. Congressional Budget Office, 1996, 2001; 
U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1996; U.S. Government Accounting Office, 1996).  
 Some of the advantages that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac enjoy are as follows. First, they 
are exempt from state and local income taxes. Second, the Secretary of the Treasury has the 
authority to purchase up to $2.25 billion of Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s securities.  Third, they 
issue “government securities,” as classified under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which in 
practice means that their securities are eligible for use as collateral for public deposits, for purchase 
by the Federal Reserve in open-market operations, and for unlimited investment by federally 
insured depository institutions.  A further implication is that they are exempt from the registration 
and reporting requirements and fees of the Securities and Exchange Commission, although Fannie 
Mae voluntarily registered its stock with the SEC in March 2003, and they are exempt from the 
provisions of many state investor protection laws.  Fourth, they use the Federal Reserve as their 
fiscal agent, which means that their securities are issued and transferred using the same system as 
U.S. Treasury borrowings. 
 Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s federal charters also present some disadvantages for 
these companies. First, their activities are restricted to residential mortgage finance. Second, they 
are restricted to the secondary market, which means that they cannot originate mortgages directly.  
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Third, there is a maximum size of mortgage that they can finance. These mortgages are usually 
described as "conforming" mortgages; larger mortgages are usually described as "jumbos."2  The 
size is linked to an annual index of housing prices; for 2004, the limit for a single-family home is 
$333,700. Fourth, the mortgages that they finance must have at least a 20 percent down payment, or 
else have mortgage insurance that is provided either by private firms or the federal government. 
Fifth, they are subject to federal safety-and-soundness regulation, including minimum leverage and 
risk-based capital requirements and supervisory examinations, by the Office of Federal Housing 
Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), an independent agency within the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development (HUD). Sixth, they are subject to "mission oversight" by HUD, which 
approves new housing finance programs and sets percent-of-business housing finance goals.  
Currently, 50 percent of Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s business must benefit low- and moderate-
income families, 31 percent must benefit underserved areas, and 20 percent must serve “special 
affordable” needs. 
  
 A Halo of Government Support 
 By law, securities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are required to include language that they 
are not guaranteed by, or otherwise an obligation of, the federal government.  However, Fannie 
Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s special federal charters and the attendant package of special benefits 
directly lower their operating costs and have created a "halo" of implied federal government support 
for the two companies.  In addition, past government actions have contributed to the perception of 
implied government support.  During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Fannie Mae was insolvent on 
a market value basis and benefited from supervisory forbearance (U.S. General Accounting Office, 
                                                 
2 Other non-conforming mortgages (besides jumbos) are those that do not meet the credit-quality standards of the two 
companies.  Also, this limit applies only to a single-unit residence; higher limits apply to two-unit, three-unit, and four-
unit residences and to multi-family housing.  Also, limits for Hawaii, Alaska, and the Virgin Islands are, by law, 50 
percent higher. 
 
 
 
 6
1990; Kane and Foster, 1986).  A summarizing phrase for this halo is that the two companies are 
“government sponsored enterprises” (GSEs).3 
 Evidence suggests that financial markets believe that the federal government would come to 
the rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (and hence their creditors) in the event of financial 
difficulties. As a result of this perceived implicit guarantee, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can 
typically borrow at interest rates that are more favorable than those of a AAA-rated corporation 
(though not quite as favorably as the rates on government debt), even though their stand-alone 
ratings would be about AA- or less.  For Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, empirical studies suggest 
that this translates into roughly a 35-40 basis point debt funding advantage, although there is 
significant variation in the estimates depending on the credit rating and maturity of the comparison 
bonds (Ambrose and Warga, 1996, 2002; Nothaft, Pearce and Stevanovic, 2002).  Other studies 
have found that the companies enjoy about a 30 basis point advantage in issuing mortgage-backed 
securities (U.S. Congressional Budget Office 1996, 2001; U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1996). 
 The presence of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the secondary mortgage market influences 
the primary mortgage market.  Most notably, Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s activities result in 
“conforming” mortgages’ carrying lower interest rates than jumbo mortgages.  Several econometric 
studies have estimated this effect, and most found the interest rate differential to be about 20-25 
basis points, although the estimates vary depending on the empirical specification, data sample, and 
time period studied. For an introduction to this literature, see U.S. Congressional Budget Office 
(2001), McKenzie (2002), Passmore (2003), and Ambrose, LaCour-Little and Sanders 
(forthcoming), and the references in these papers.   
                                                 
3 The Federal Home Loan Bank System, which serves as a wholesale bank for many federally insured depository 
institutions (banks, S&Ls, and credit unions), enjoys a similar package of favorable features and is similarly described as 
a GSE.  There are also GSEs that serve agricultural credit markets (Farm Credit System and the Federal Agricultural 
Mortgage Corporation, or Farmer Mac) and the student loan market (Student Loan Marketing Association, or Sallie 
Mae), although the latter is in the process of privatization under the name SLM Corp. The financial pages of major 
newspapers often set aside a separate box of "agency issues" to report the yields on GSE securities – a visible illustration 
of how they are treated differently. 
 
 
 
 7
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may bring other potential benefits to mortgage markets, 
although these claims are often controversial. For example, one controversy is over whether Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac enhance the stability of the mortgage market by acting as a large “market 
maker” in mortgage-backed securities and thereby reducing interest rate volatility in that market 
(Gonzalez-Rivera, 2001; Naranjo and Toevs, 2002; Peek and Wilcox, 2003). We will discuss one 
counterargument to this point below – the possibility that the sheer size of these mortgage 
portfolios creates a potential for systemic risk in the financial system. 
 Another claim sometimes made is that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can act as a focal 
point for market-wide standard setting with respect to technology and certain “best practices.” For 
example, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have each developed widely used automated 
underwriting systems (known as Desktop Underwriter and Loan Prospector, respectively) that 
evaluate an individual loan’s credit risk, including whether it meets the companies’ purchase 
requirements. These systems have greatly reduced the time and cost of the mortgage origination 
process.  However, several large lenders that already had similar systems in place resented the 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac systems, characterizing them as an unwarranted intrusion into the 
primary mortgage market.  
 
Residential Mortgages: A Primer 
 
 To appreciate the central role that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac play in U.S. residential 
mortgage finance, a brief tutorial on mortgage finance itself will be useful, including the process of 
mortgage securitization. 
 
 Some Interesting Aspects of Residential Mortgages 
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 At one level, a residential mortgage is a simple debt instrument.  The purchaser of a home 
borrows money to finance the home purchase.  The home serves as the collateral for the loan.  The 
borrower makes monthly payments that cover the interest on the outstanding principal and the 
amortization of that principal. 
 The complexity of the mortgage as a debt instrument arises because of the interactions 
among three properties of most U.S. single-family residential mortgages: lengthy maturities, fixed 
interest rates, and “free” prepayment options.4   First, the term of most mortgages is for 15 or 30 
years, with the average term of a new mortgage for a single-family residence hovering at about 27-
28 years over the past decade. Second, fixed-rate mortgages are more common than adjustable-rate 
mortgages, which have been one-quarter or less of the market in the last 6-7 years and exceeded 
one-third of the market in only a single year during the 1990s.  Indeed, adjustable rate mortgages 
were relatively unknown before the early 1980s, primarily because federal regulation prevented 
most depository institutions from originating them.  Finally, these long-term, fixed-rate mortgages 
are generally prepayable without a penalty, in the sense that the borrower can accelerate the 
repayment of principal or repay the entire amount at any time, at no additional cost.  Though the 
borrower does not pay an explicit penalty at the time of repayment, the cost of the option to the 
lender is incorporated into the contract interest rate and the fees that the lender charges at the 
time of origination. 
 A mortgage lender faces two kinds of risks. First, credit risk bears on whether the lender 
will be repaid the principal amount that has been lent and the contracted interest. Second, market 
risk refers to whether changes in market conditions -- primarily interest rate changes – will affect 
the value of the mortgage. 
                                                 
4 More detail on the characteristics of residential mortgages can be found on the website of the Federal Housing 
Finance Board: <http://www.fhfb.gov>. 
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 The credit risk on most single-family residential mortgages is quite low.5  After all, lenders 
only originate such loans after screening for adequate household income and a good credit history. 
Further, the home itself serves as the collateral for the mortgage in the event of default. Most lenders 
require a 20 percent down payment or some form of mortgage insurance.  The credit risk losses on 
mortgages held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac averaged 5.4 basis points annually over the 1987-
2002 period, and the losses averaged only 1 basis point annually for 1999-2002 (Inside Mortgage 
Finance, 2003). 
 A fixed-rate debt instrument also creates market risk for the lender.  If interest rates 
increase, the price of the instrument declines; and if interest rates decrease, the price of the 
instrument rises.  The longer is the maturity of the instrument, the greater are the associated price 
swings.  These risks are further complicated by changes in the rate of prepayment. A lower 
interest rate, which would benefit the lender of a fixed-rate instrument, makes borrowers more 
likely to repay their existing mortgages, either by refinancing the existing mortgage or deciding 
that the time is right to purchase a new home.  This quickening of the repayment rate deprives 
the lender of the potential capital gain on the mortgage that would otherwise occur on a debt 
instrument that could not be repaid; equivalently, the greater pace of repayment is occurring just 
when the lender doesn't want repayment, since the lender can then only relend (or reinvest) the 
funds at the lower prevailing interest rates. Conversely, a higher interest rate leads to less 
prepayment. In this case, the capital loss that the lender would have experienced on a fixed-rate 
debt instrument as interest rates increase is compounded by the slackening of the prepayment 
rate; in essence, prepayments are slackening just when the lender wishes that they would 
                                                 
 
   5 Two growth areas in residential mortgage lending that are exceptions to this broad claim are “subprime” and high 
loan-to-value loans.  Subprime loans are those made to borrowers with material blemishes in their recent credit 
history.  High loan-to-value loans, while generally made to individuals with especially good credit, have principal 
amounts equal to or greater than the appraised value of the property acting as collateral. 
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accelerate. In the specialized literature, this phenomenon of additional adverse effects on the 
mortgage lender from decreases or increases in interest rates is described as the "negative 
convexity" of the mortgage instrument. 
 
 Mortgage Securitization 
 Prior to 1970, mortgages were largely a non-traded debt instrument.6  The initial lender that 
originated the loan usually held the loan until it matured (or was prepayed), collecting interest and 
principal repayments in the interim.  In 1970, Ginnie Mae issued the first "pass-through" mortgage-
backed securities, which created a claim on an underlying pool of residential mortgages and meant 
that security-holders had the right to receive a fractional share of the interest and principal 
repayments of the pool as a whole.  The Ginnie Mae securities carried the federal government’s 
promise of timely payment of interest and principal, on top of the guarantees issued by the FHA and 
the VA on the underlying mortgages.  For the first time, the claim on a stream of mortgage 
payments could be readily traded. 
 A number of aspects of mortgage-backed securities are worth noting.  First, securitization 
greatly widens the potential market for the ultimate financing of residential mortgages.  Anyone 
who buys the security directly or indirectly (for example, through a mutual fund or pension fund) is, 
in essence, providing the mortgage financing. 
 Second, investors in mortgage-backed securities are in a poor position to assess the credit 
risk as to what proportion of the individual mortgages in the underlying pool will be repaid on 
schedule, so they require some assurance on these credit risks.  Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and 
Freddie Mac offer direct guarantees with respect to these repayment rates when they issue such 
securities. “Private-label” securitizations offer other kinds of reassurance: for example, private 
                                                 
6 As was mentioned above, an exception to this pattern involved originations by mortgage banks, which immediately 
sold the mortgages to Fannie Mae (which then held the mortgages in its portfolio). 
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financial guarantees; “overcollateralization,” in which a security issuer pledges assets to back the 
securitization in an amount that exceeds the face value of the securities being issued; or 
structuring the securities with senior and subordinated tranches, such that credit losses are first 
absorbed by more subordinate securities up to certain values.  
 Third, mortgage-backed securities holders are not protected from the market risks 
associated with holding long-term, fixed-rate, prepayable mortgages.  The holder of a simple 
"pass-through" mortgage-backed security (described above) experiences the same effects of 
interest rate changes -- including the effects of prepayments -- as does the owner of an otherwise 
similar unsecuritized pool of mortgages. 
 Fourth, the securitization process creates opportunities for "slicing and dicing" the cash 
flows in ways that allow the risks to be better allocated among capital markets participants 
according to their preferences (Fabozzi, 2001).  The "senior/subordinated" structure noted above 
is one such method.  As another example, the cash flows from a mortgage pool can be divided 
into a "principal-only" security and an "interest-only" security, where the former has 
characteristics that heighten interest-rate risks, while the latter (at least for modest changes in 
interest rates) ameliorates them.7  More elaborate multiple-layer securities, in which some 
investors have more buffering from early prepayment and others have less, can also be created from 
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac pass-through securities and are described as "collateralized mortgage 
obligations" (CMOs) or "real estate mortgage investment conduits" (REMICs). 
 
                                                 
7 These characteristics are most readily seen by first considering the properties of the interest-only security:  Holders 
receive payments only so long as the borrower does not prepay the mortgage (at which time the holder ceases 
receiving anything).  Thus, when interest rates rise and prepayments slacken, the effect of the lengthening of the 
expected stream of interest payments may exceed the effect of the higher discount rates that should be applied to 
those payments, and the value of the interest-only instrument may rise.  Since the value of the overall mortgage falls 
when interest rates rise, the value of the principal-only instrument must fall by an even greater percentage.  
Conversely, when interest rates fall, the value of the interest-only instrument could fall as well (the effect of the 
shortening of the expected stream of interest payments could exceed the effect of the lower discount rates), while the 
value of the principal-only instrument rises in value (because of both the lower discount rate and the quicker 
repayment of principal). 
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 Trends in Residential Mortgage Finance  
 The structure of residential mortgage markets is substantially different today than it was in 
1970.  At that time, the dominant pattern was as follows:  The financial institution -- typically a 
savings and loan or a savings bank -- that originated a fixed-rate mortgage loan also held it in its 
portfolio, and the same financial institution collected the monthly payments and dealt with 
delinquencies.  The funding for the loan was provided by the institution's deposits, which were 
insured by the federal government, through the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation 
(for S&Ls) or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (for commercial banks).  As Table 2 
shows, in 1970 savings and loan institutions held over 56 percent of outstanding single-family 
mortgages, and commercial banks and savings and loans together held over 70 percent. 
 By contrast, the typical pattern today is for mortgage originators to share some or all of the 
risks associated with fixed-rate residential mortgage loans with the secondary market.  Depository 
institutions typically do this by securitizing their conforming mortgages with Fannie Mae or Freddie 
Mac and their FHA- and VA- insured loans with Ginnie Mae.  The resulting mortgage-backed 
securities carry an assurance as to the timely payment of principal and interest, which is backed by a 
full-faith-and-credit guarantee of the federal government (Ginnie Mae) or an implied federal 
guarantee (Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac).  The originator will elect either to hold or to sell the 
mortgage-backed security, although it may continue to “service” the underlying loans by collecting 
monthly payments and dealing with delinquencies.  Non-depository mortgage originators, such as 
mortgage banks, tend to sell their mortgages outright – often to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. 
 Only adjustable rate mortgages or those fixed-rate mortgages that exceed the conforming 
loan limits ("jumbos") or that do not meet certain the underwriting criteria are likely to be held in 
the originator's portfolio (if the originator is a depository institution) or securitized in a "private 
label" offering.  As Table 2 also shows, as of year-end 2000, the share of “whole loan” single-
family mortgages held by banks and savings and loans had plummeted to below 30 percent, despite 
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an increase in commercial banks’ share of single-family mortgage mortgages between 1970-2000.  
However, if one were also to include the banks’ and S&Ls’ holdings of mortgage-backed securities 
(and thus the depositories’ exposure to mortgage-related market risk), their share would rise to 
slightly over 40 percent. 
 This vertically dis-integrated structure allows for greater specialization among 
institutions with respect to mortgage originations, collecting payments, dealing with delinquent 
loans, funding, liability issuance, and guarantees. 
 
   Why the Trend to Securitization and Dis-Integration of Mortgage Markets? 
 Technological advancements -- especially improved and lower-cost data processing and 
telecommunications – have undergirded both the expansion of the securitization process and 
division of the market into many interlocking providers.  Loan originators are able to gather 
information about prospective borrowers, analyze it, make judgments about who to lend to, and 
transmit that information and those judgments to others – notably, securitizers and investors -- in 
ways and over distances that weren’t possible in the 1970s.  Regulation, however, has also 
contributed to the expanded role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in residential mortgage markets, in 
at least two ways.  First, since 1988, the regulatory risk-based capital (net worth) requirements that 
apply to banks and savings and loans have included a lower requirement of 1.6 percent for holding 
mortgage-backed securities issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, compared with the 4 percent 
requirement for holding whole (unsecuritized) residential mortgage loans.  At first blush, since risk-
based capital requirements for whole-loan mortgages are at the same level as the minimum 
“leverage” requirements for an adequately capitalized depository institution (a 4 percent ratio of a 
depository’s overall capital to assets), there would seem to be little market impact from these risk-
based capital charges.  However, in cases where a depository institution holds a diversified loan 
portfolio that includes higher-risk loans requiring capital levels above the minimum leverage 
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requirements, their portfolio may be bound by risk-based capital requirements. So, at the margin, 
the lower capital requirements for mortgage-backed securities would strongly encourage the 
institution to substitute mortgage-backed securities for “whole” mortgage loans.  Frame and White 
(2004b) discuss this “regulatory capital arbitrage” in greater detail. 
 Second, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are required to hold at least 2.5 percent capital 
against mortgages (or their own mortgage-backed securities) that they retain in their portfolios.  
At first glance, this would seem to put such portfolio retention at a capital cost disadvantage as 
compared with depositories’ holdings of mortgage-backed securities (at 1.6 percent).  But in 
comparison with depositories that are bound by the 4 percent minimum leverage requirement 
(such as savings and loans that tend to specialize in mortgage lending), the purchases by Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac for their own portfolios would have a capital cost advantage. 
 Strategic management decisions have also been an influence.  When Freddie Mac became a 
publicly traded company in 1989 and was freed from the constraints that had previously been 
imposed by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, its management soon realized that its favorable 
borrowing rates provided an excellent opportunity to expand its income by earning a spread on the 
difference between mortgages that it held in portfolio and its favorable borrowing rates.  Though 
Fannie Mae was chastened and restrained by its near-insolvency in the early 1980s, by the 1990s its 
management had also adopted this expansionist mentality. 
 Ironically, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac did not expand as dramatically in the 1970s and 
1980s, when their position as national operators in mortgage markets should have given them a 
comparative advantage vis-à-vis their depository rivals who were restrained by state and federal 
limitations on interstate branching. Apparently, it took technological and regulatory changes, 
supplemented by some strategic management decisions, to bring about their expansion. 
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 The Issues 
 
 The federal charters for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and particularly the implied 
federal guaranty of their financial obligations, raise the central policy issue. On one side, the 
implied guarantee on Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s financial obligations allows the federal 
government to reduce mortgage interest rates for most residential mortgages by about 20-25 
basis points -- without an annual appropriation. On the other side, this policy creates a contingent 
liability for taxpayers in the event that either enterprise becomes insolvent and the government 
elects to provide financial assistance, as well as causing additional distortions in the housing 
market.  These tradeoffs involving Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can then be parsed into five 
related issues: a) how the companies’ activities mesh with other public policies that encourage the 
construction and consumption of housing; b) the appropriate safety-and-soundness regulatory 
structure; c) the systemic risks that may flow from the size of the companies; d) the effect of the 
companies activities on allocative efficiency; and e) the consequences of the two companies for 
efficient market structures.  
 
 Encouragements for Housing and Macroeconomic Efficiency 
 U.S. public policy, at all levels of government, encourages the construction and 
consumption of housing.  The largest incentives pertain to income tax advantages: the exclusion 
of the implicit income from housing by owner-occupiers, while allowing the deduction of mortgage 
interest and local real estate taxes.  Additional tax encouragements include the exemption of much 
owner-occupied housing from capital gains taxation and accelerated depreciation on rental housing.  
Direct provision of rental (“public”) housing is another significant program. 
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 In terms of housing finance, some government programs operate directly, like the mortgage 
insurance provided by FHA and VA (which allows lower down payments) and the securitization of 
associated mortgages by Ginnie Mae. Other programs support housing indirectly: federal deposit 
insurance for depository institutions whose portfolios contain some residential mortgages, savings 
and loan charters with mandates to invest in residential mortgages, and the Federal Home Loan 
Bank System -- originally created by the federal government in 1932 as a “wholesale” bank that 
would make low-cost loans to S&Ls.  Federal sponsorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are 
another indirect form of support for housing finance and hence housing consumption.  
 The motives underlying these public policy actions toward housing are diverse.  One motive 
is to assist the middle class with a major household expenditure. Another motive is to support 
revenues and employment in residential construction, sales, and complementary industries. Yet 
another motive is that homeownership can be viewed as a way of encouraging households to save 
(at least so long home values do not decline, or other offsetting reductions in saving or increases in 
borrowing don’t offset the value of home equity). But for most economists, the strongest arguments 
for government support of housing involve either a form of in-kind redistributions of income toward 
lower-income households, or the claim that homeownership has positive externalities. For example, 
an owner is likely to care more about a residence and the surrounding neighborhood than is an 
absentee landlord, which can result in positive externalities including the external appearance of 
property, greater watchfulness leading to greater public safety, and support for local public goods.  
A modest but growing empirical literature provides some documentation for these positive 
externalities for neighborhoods and even positive effects on owner-occupier families themselves. 
(Green and White, 1997; DiPasquale and Glaeser, 1999; Aaronson, 2000; and the references 
therein). 
 If redistribution to those with lower income or the positive externalities from a higher rate of 
homeownership are the goals, then the logical policy would encourage low- and moderate-income 
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households, who may be on the margin between renting and owning, to become first-time home 
buyers.  Such programs might aim to reduce down payments, since the size of down payment can be 
a binding constraint for low-income households (Linneman and Wachter, 1989; Quercia, McCarthy 
and Wachter, 2003), or to reduce monthly payments.  However, most housing programs are broad-
based efforts that encourage more housing construction and consumption throughout the income 
and social spectrum.  For example, the income tax benefits from home ownership operate as 
exemptions and deductions, which means that they tend to favor disproportionately higher-income 
households in higher marginal tax brackets (Rosen, 1979; Gervais, 2002). 
 Federal sponsorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is of this broad-based nature.  In 
2002, the conforming loan limit for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was $300,700.  In that same 
year, according to the Federal Housing Finance Board, the median price of a new home that was 
sold was $187,600, and an 80 percent mortgage on that sale price would have been $150,080.  
Thus, the conforming loan limits allow Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to purchase residential 
mortgage loans that are far beyond the range that would encompass the low- or moderate-income, 
first-time buying household.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are required to meet percent-of-business 
housing goals established by HUD involving annual purchases of loans involving a) households 
with less than median incomes; b) underserved areas, such as low-income and high-minority census 
tracts; and c) very low-income households and low-income households living in low-income areas.  
Nevertheless, the bulk of the mortgage purchases by the two companies have not involved the 
groups that ought to be the target of homeownership-encouraging activities (U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget, 2004).  While some research has found that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
have recently increased the supply of mortgage credit available to low- and moderate-income 
households (Ambrose and Thibodeau, 2004), it does not appear that the companies’ activities have 
appreciably affected the rate of homeownership in the United States (Feldman, 2002; Painter and 
Redfearn, 2002; Freeman, Galster and Malega, 2003). 
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 Such broad-based encouragements for housing imply that most beneficiaries would have 
bought anyway, and the marginal effects are largely to cause them to buy larger and better-
appointed homes, on larger lots, and/or to buy second homes.  In turn, this broad-based 
encouragement means that the United States has invested in an inefficiently large housing stock, 
although the empirical literature that attempts to measure the magnitudes of these broad social 
consequences is surprisingly small.  In one recent study, Gervais (2002) finds that the taxation of the 
implicit rents on owner-occupied housing (accompanied by a compensating adjustment in tax rates) 
could cause general consumption levels to increase by almost 5 percent.  Taylor (1998) finds that 
over-investment in housing persisted during 1975-1995 and estimates the over-investment in 
housing at over $220 billion per year (or $300 per month for each owner-occupied home) for the 
late 1990s – consistent with prior research by Mills (1987a, b). 
 These results can be summarized bluntly.  The United States has too much housing (and not 
enough of other goods and services), and federal sponsorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
exacerbates this problem.  Moreover, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do not do an especially good job 
of focusing on the low- and moderate-income first-time buyer where the social argument for support 
of homeownership is strongest. 
 
 Safety and Soundness 
 The implicit guarantee of Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s obligations suggests that  
attention be paid to the companies’ financial health.  How could either enterprise become 
insolvent?  One way is if the credit losses mushroomed on the mortgages they guaranteed or held 
outright.  This would occur if homeowners could not repay their mortgages and the prices of 
housing fell below outstanding loan values.  Another – and perhaps more likely -- way is if they 
failed to hedge their market risks adequately, and the value of their mortgage portfolios fell  
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below the values of their outstanding debt obligations.  This happened to Fannie Mae, as well as 
to thousands of savings and loans, in the early 1980s. 
 What is the magnitude of this contingent liability to the federal government?  One way to 
answer this question is to consider how much the government potentially would have to pay to a 
third party guarantor who would have the same probabilistic-contingent obligation to make 
whole the holders of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac debt and mortgage-backed securities in the 
event that one of them failed.  Such estimates are approximated by the gross benefits accruing to 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac from the implied guarantee in terms of both of the companies’ debt 
and their mortgage-backed securities.8  A “back-of-the-envelope” calculation of this can be 
constructed using year-end 2003 data on their outstanding debt and mortgage-backed securities, 
coupled with estimates of the interest rate advantages that the two companies enjoy (40 basis 
points on debt and 30 basis points on mortgage-backed securities) as a result of implied 
government support, values for portfolio and MBS growth (4%9), a discount rate (5.00 percent, 
based on long-term Treasury bond yields), and a time horizon (25 years).  These numbers 
suggest an estimated contingent liability borne by the federal government of approximately $288 
billion. 
 The implied federal guarantee of Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s financial obligations 
create a “moral hazard” problem.  Because of the implied guarantee, creditors do not monitor the 
firms’ activities as closely as they otherwise would.  As a consequence of this reduced monitoring, 
the managements of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can engage in activities that involve greater risk 
(with greater liability consequences for the government), since the companies' owners will benefit 
                                                 
8 Recall that the gross benefits from the implied guarantee are simply the differential between the interest rates that 
the GSEs’ creditors actually demand (given their belief that the federal government would be likely to bail them out) 
and what they would require if the two companies were wholly divorced from the federal government. 
9 Though the overall mortgage market has grown at an average annual rate of 8.5 percent over the past decade, this 
rate could not be sustained indefinitely, nor could the two GSEs’ even faster growth.  Instead, we have assumed a 
growth rate that would be roughly equal to the growth of nominal U.S. GDP.  At the other extreme, if the two GSEs’ 
portfolios and MBS were to be frozen at year-end 2003 levels, the contingent liability would be “merely” $183 
billion. 
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from the "upside" outcomes while being buffered (because of the limited liability of corporate 
owners) from the full consequences of large "downside" outcomes. 
 Safety-and-soundness regulatory oversight is one way to deal with insufficient market 
monitoring and discipline. However, in the case of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the case for such 
regulation must be more nuanced.  The federal guarantee itself is implicit and based on 
expectations, rather than a legally binding obligation of the government.  The presence of safety-
and-soundness oversight likely reinforces such expectations, and it is thus unclear whether safety-
and-soundness regulation for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac actually reduces taxpayer exposure 
(Frame and White, 2004a; Greenspan, 2004). 
 The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), within the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), is the safety and soundness regulator for Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac. OFHEO is authorized to set risk-based capital standards, conduct 
examinations, and take enforcement actions if unsafe or unsound financial or management 
practices are identified.10  However, OFHEO has been criticized for a perceived lack of 
effectiveness, including the lengthy delays that the regulator experienced in issuing and 
finalizing its risk-based capital regulation for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (U.S. General 
Accounting Office, 1997).  More recently, Treasury Secretary John Snow (2003) remarked that 
there is a “general recognition that the supervisory system for the housing GSEs neither has the 
tools, nor the stature, to effectively deal with the current size, complexity, and importance of these 
enterprises.”  Most important, OFHEO currently lacks the power to place an insolvent GSE into 
receivership. 
 A number of legislative proposals were introduced in Congress during 2003 to enhance 
the safety and soundness regulation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Frame and White, 2004a). 
                                                 
10 Prior to the creation of OFHEO in 1992, HUD maintained exclusive regulatory oversight responsibilities over 
Fannie Mae and (for 1989-1992) Freddie Mac. Prior to the passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery 
and Enforcement Act of 1989, Freddie Mac was the responsibility of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board. 
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These proposals would move the safety-and-soundness regulator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
out of HUD (where the culture is more focused on housing) and into either the Treasury (where the 
culture is more focused on safety and soundness) or create a freestanding agency outside the 
executive branch. This relocated regulatory agency might also be given some additional powers. For 
example, it might have the ability to levy fees on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to fund itself, thus 
removing the agency from the vagaries of annual budgetary appropriations. It would have a stronger 
ability to set and revise the minimum capital requirements that the two companies must meet, as 
well as to regulate new programs or new activities. Finally, the new agency might have the power to 
appoint a receiver that could liquidate or otherwise dispose of either Fannie Mae’s or Freddie Mac’s 
assets in the event that one of them became insolvent. At the time that this article was completed in 
fall 2004, no definitive legislative action had been taken. 
 
 Systemic Risk 
 In recent testimony before Congress, Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan (2004) 
suggested that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac may pose “systemic risks” to the U.S. economy.  That 
is, if one of the companies became financially distressed, enough harm to the overall financial 
system could be caused such that a non-trivial reduction in general economic activity would result.11  
Such concerns generally begin with the observations that these companies are large, highly 
leveraged, and focused on a particular asset class that they dominate.  As noted above, as of year-
end 2003, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were the second and third largest U.S. companies 
measured by assets.  In terms of financial leverage, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac operated with 
ratios of total capital to total assets of 3.4 percent and 3.9 percent, respectively, as of that same date.  
                                                 
11 The discussion below focuses on systemic risks emanating from either (or both) Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.  
Fahey (2003) and U.S. Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (2003) suggest that because of their implicit 
government guarantees, the companies might also act as a source of strength to financial markets in the face of 
external shocks. 
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(By contrast, FDIC-insured depository institutions maintained a ratio of total capital to total assets 
of 9.2 percent on December 31, 2003.)  Finally, about 86 percent of the combined balance sheet of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac constitutes mortgage-related assets.  Almost 50 percent of all the 
credit risk and 20 percent of all market risk associated with U.S. residential mortgage assets are held 
by the two companies.  The U.S. Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (2003) provides a 
detailed discussion of systemic risk as it may pertain to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
 Concerns about the systemic consequences of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have focused on 
the concentration of market risk within the two companies.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do hedge 
these risks in their portfolios in various ways, thereby distributing the market risk into the broader 
capital market.  One way they do this is by issuing “callable debt,” so that if interest rates fall and a 
surge of prepaying home mortgage occurs, Fannie and Freddie can refinance their existing debt as 
well. The companies also use derivative financial instruments, like interest-rate swaps, to reduce 
their exposure to interest rate risk.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac rely heavily on “dynamic 
hedging,” whereby they rebalance their portfolios in response to changing interest rates that 
influence expected prepayment behavior (U.S. Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, 
2003; Jaffee, 2003).   
 A specific area of systemic concern has been the effect of portfolio rebalancing by Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac on fixed-income markets. For example, a decline in the general level of 
interest rates often leads to increased prepayment risk, which in turn reduces the duration of 
mortgage-related assets.  Holders of these assets, if they would like to maintain the original duration 
of their portfolios, would then have to purchase other longer-term assets to add duration.  Increased 
demand for these longer-term assets would increase the price of these assets, or equivalently reduce 
the interest rates on them further. Perli and Sack (2003) present statistical evidence that mortgage-
related hedging significantly influences the behavior of the 10-year swap rate, although their 
analysis is not focused on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac specifically. 
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 The U.S. Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (2003) notes several conditions 
that make an economy vulnerable to financial sector shocks, including weak market discipline of 
institutions and poor public disclosure. “Market discipline” refers to the ability of investors and 
creditors to track the changing financial condition and risk of firms and securities, to price 
securities accordingly, and, through pricing, to influence the actions of management (Bliss and 
Flannery, 2001).  Consistent with the presence of some market discipline of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, Seiler (2003) finds that the share prices and debt yields of these companies respond to 
new information about their respective financial risks.  
 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have taken steps to strengthen their public disclosure through 
a set of six voluntary initiatives announced in 2000: 1) to issue subordinated debt, 2) to meet 
certain liquidity standards, 3) to enhance credit-risk disclosures, 4) to enhance interest rate 
disclosures; 5) to obtain annual credit ratings, and 6) to self-implement and report their 
regulatory risk-based capital levels.  (This sixth initiative was rendered obsolete in 2002 when 
OFHEO’s risk-based capital standard became effective.)  Also, in 2002 both Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac agreed to register their common stock with the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
although at the time of this writing only Fannie Mae has followed through. These steps all seem 
headed in the right direction, although some improvements also seem possible (Frame and Wall, 
2002; Jaffee, 2003).  A more direct approach to reducing systemic risk associated with Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac would be to limit their debt issuance, thereby capping the size of their respective 
balance sheets (Greenspan, 2004). 
 Two other arguments about systemic risk related to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have been 
discussed. One is that the companies have seemingly large exposures to a small number of 
derivatives counterparties. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are significant end-users of interest rate 
derivatives, and together the notional amount of these instruments outstanding as of year-end 2001 
was $1.6 trillion for the two companies.  Moreover, as of the same date, five counterparties 
 
 
 
 24
accounted for about 59 percent of their over-the-counter derivatives.  However, the notional 
amounts of derivatives often bear little direct relationship to the actual credit exposure; as a simple 
example, an option to borrow $100 million at a certain fixed rate of interest six months from today 
has a notional value of $100 million – although the price of the actual option is much lower.  
Moreover, counterparties in a derivatives trade are required to post collateral if their net exposure 
exceeds certain limits, with lower-rated counterparties posting proportionately more collateral. 
Indeed, U.S. Office of Housing Enterprise Oversight (2003) reports that as of year-end 2001, the net 
uncollateralized exposures were only $110 million for Fannie Mae and $69 million for Freddie 
Mac. In the event of counterparty default, however, there is “rollover risk” to the extent that Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac find it difficult or particularly expensive to replace their hedging positions 
(Jaffee, 2003).  An introduction to derivatives and their uses and misuses in this journal can be 
found in Stulz (2004). 
 The other argument is that, under current regulations, federally insured depository 
institutions can make unlimited investments in the obligations of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  
However, as illustrated in Frame and Wall (2002), although a large number of banks hold such 
obligations in amounts that exceed their net worth (just over 50 percent as of year-end 2000), most 
of these institutions are very small (over 95 percent as of year-end 2000).  Further, in the event of 
financial distress at either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, the value losses incurred by mortgage-
backed securities investors would likely be minimal, given that the securities are fully collateralized 
by mortgages with very low historic loss rates.  Kulp (2004) assesses the exposure of FDIC-insured 
institutions to privatization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and finds minimal impact, although that 
analysis does not consider the impact in the case of financial distress at either or both of the 
companies. 
 
 Allocative Efficiency 
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 The benefits embedded in the federal charters of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac act as a 
barrier to entry in the secondary conforming mortgage market (Goodman and Passmore, 1992; 
Hermalin and Jaffee, 1996).  In that market, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can be characterized as 
duopolists. However, instead of raising prices, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac cause mortgage 
interest rates to be below those that the private market would otherwise provide. For this reason, 
Carlton, Gross and Stillman (2002) conclude that the two companies do not raise antitrust 
concerns. 
 Nevertheless, an examination of market power in the context of a government subsidy 
should not offer comparisons with an unsubsidized market, but instead should ask whether the 
subsidy is completely passed through by competing firms to customers. Some theoretical research 
has examined various equilibrium outcomes arising from interactions between a perfectly 
competitive primary mortgage market and a less than perfectly competitive secondary mortgage 
market (for example, Gan and Riddiough, 2004; Passmore, Sparks and Ingpen, 2002; Heuson, 
Passmore and Sparks, 2001; Passmore and Sparks, 2000).  Such studies examine issues related to 
mortgage guarantee pricing as well as the distribution of mortgage credit risk (by risk 
classification) between mortgage originators and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
 The empirical evidence suggests that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do retain some portion 
of their federal benefits and hence are not acting in a perfectly competitive manner.  One piece of 
casual evidence is the extraordinary profitability of these two firms.  For the years 1998-2002, for 
example, Fannie Mae earned an average return on equity of 25.4 percent while Freddie Mac earned 
an average of 24.2 percent. By contrast, the industry return on equity for all FDIC-insured 
commercial banks for the same five years was around 14 percent.12  A second piece of evidence is 
                                                 
12 For the 15  years 1988-2002, Fannie Mae averaged 27.5 percent, while Freddie Mac averaged 23.5 percent.  An 
alternative profitability ratio, return on assets (ROA), is substantially lower for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac than that for 
commercial banks.  The primary reason for this is that Fannie and Freddie are far more leveraged.  As an indicator of 
likely rents from less-than-completely-vigorous competition, return on equity is the superior measure. 
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from studies of using Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as conduits for a mortgage interest rate subsidy. 
Feldman (1998) reviews the various approaches, while U.S. Congressional Budget Office (2001, 
2004) and Passmore (2003) offer more recent analyses.  For example, the U.S. Congressional 
Budget Office (2004) estimated that in 2003 the two companies received gross benefits of $19.6 
billion accruing from their federal charters, of which they passed through $13.4 billion to 
homebuyers through lower mortgage rates and retained $6.2 billion for their shareholders.  Using a 
simulation exercise, Passmore (2003) estimates the median after-tax present value of Fannie Mae’s 
and Freddie Mac’s net federal benefits at $72 billion, accounting for 60 percent of the companies’ 
combined market capitalization.  Outside analyses sponsored by Fannie Mae disputes various 
assumptions and research methods used in these studies (for example, Toevs, 2001; Greene 2004; 
Blinder, Flannery and Kamihachi, 2004).  
 Of course, if one believes that broad-brush public policies encourage too much housing 
investment and that the activities of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac exacerbate this problem, then 
the exercise of market power by these firms will improve allocative efficiency in the economy. 
 
 Institutions for Greater Market Efficiency  
 As an historical matter, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have surely enhanced the liquidity of 
mortgage loans, improved the geographic diversification of mortgage credit risk, and nationally 
integrated mortgage markets.  Further, the presence of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and their 
implied guarantees may well have been important for the innovation and development of mortgage 
securitization in the 1970s and 1980s.  Nevertheless, most of these benefits can now be achieved as 
a result of geographic deregulation of banking, which has allowed large, nationwide mortgage 
originators to emerge. Mortgage securitization is now a well-established technology of finance that 
does not require the special status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. So, do Fannie Mae and Freddie 
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Mac still provide a necessary institutional underpinning for a more efficient mortgage market in the 
current economic environment? 
 Because of their special status, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can issue blanket credit-loss 
guarantees on an entire pool of loans as well as avoid the costs of having their securities rated by 
rating agencies or registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.  In contrast, private-
label mortgage-backed securities often have a structure that involves creating different levels of 
seniority of debt, obtaining securities ratings from rating agencies like Moody's or Standard & 
Poor's, and registering with the Securities and Exchange Commission – all of which involve 
transactions costs.  Further, investors in the senior mortgage-backed securities follow the credit 
performance of the underlying loans, which results in monitoring costs. In this way, the presence of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (and their special halo) might eliminate significant transactions costs 
(Woodward, 2004).  However, these transaction costs are actually shifted rather than eliminated: 
investors believe that they are shielded from credit risk not only by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
but also ultimately by taxpayers.   
 Another argument is that the new-era securitization process is an inherently more efficient 
way of providing mortgage finance and that the expansion of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (with 
their implicit federal guarantee) at the expense of depositories' holdings of residential mortgages 
(supported by the depositories’ explicit federal deposit insurance) is evidence of this superior 
efficiency (Van Order 2000a,b; 2001).  Three potential counterpoints come to mind here.  First, 
securitization is a widely used technology of finance in the United States: it permeates  our 
consumer credit markets (mortgages, credit cards, auto loans) and is used by both depository and 
non-depository financial institutions. Second, as discussed earlier, an important reason why 
depository institutions securitize mortgages with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac rather than holding 
them in their portfolios is the differential treatment of these assets for purposes of required 
regulatory risk-based capital.  Finally, it is marginal debt funding costs that matter, rather than 
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average costs.  While these are probably roughly equal for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (that is,  
they face a perfectly elastic supply of loanable funds), banks likely face a rising marginal cost curve 
as they tap into non-core deposits or borrow money from wholesale lenders (like the Federal Home 
Loan Banks) or the capital markets. Hence, the extent to which the dramatic changes in the 
structure of U.S. residential mortgage markets are efficiency-driven rather than regulation-driven 
remains unclear.13 
 Finally, there is no assurance that the current organizational structures for Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac are the most efficient.  Since the Congress has issued only two charters of this 
particular kind, no competitive processes exist to reward more efficient firms and winnow less 
efficient firms.  The market for corporate control also cannot operate effectively, since the two 
companies’ large sizes and special status likely make them immune to a takeover by a firm or an 
investor group. 
 
What is to be done? 
 
 First-Best 
 There seems no strong efficiency reason for preserving the existing structure of Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac. They mostly just add to an already excessive encouragement for housing 
in the United States, using an implied guarantee that (to the extent that it would be honored) 
creates a contingent liability for the U.S. government. Thus, a complete privatization of the two 
companies would be the first-best outcome.  In this vision, the two companies would no longer 
enjoy any special privileges, but also would no longer be restricted to their current narrow slice 
                                                 
13  As a related matter, whenever either of the two firms has expanded slightly in "horizontal" (sub-prime lending) or 
"vertical" (providing underwriting software to mortgage originators) directions -- or even publicly contemplated such 
moves -- critics have complained that the two companies' ability to expand arises solely from the low-cost funding that 
they enjoy from the implicit guarantee and not because of any inherent efficiency advantage.  
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of the financial world.  The consequence of such a step for residential mortgage markets would 
be modest:  Mortgage rates would probably rise by about 20-25 basis points (ceteris paribus).  It 
is highly unlikely that grass would grow in the streets of America as a consequence, while grass 
surely would continue to grow in most backyards.  Because the United States already builds and 
consumes too much housing, this would be a move in the right direction. Instead of backing a 
broad subsidy to housing through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the federal government ought to 
focus on assisting first-time home buyers with low and moderate incomes (Calomiris, 2001; White, 
2003). 
 
 Second-Best 
 The complete privatization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac seems an unlikely outcome in 
the current political environment.  Accordingly, second-best measures should be considered. 
 One useful step would be for government officials to state clearly, whenever the subject 
comes up, that the federal government does not guarantee the debt of Fannie Mae or Freddie 
Mac and will not bail them (or their creditors) out. No presidential administration has explicitly 
made such a statement. More typical are carefully crafted comments that reiterate that the federal 
government is not required to bail out Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, but fall short of flatly stating 
that the government will not do so (for example, Mankiw, 2004).  One step toward separating the 
federal government from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac has recently occurred.  Five of the 18 board 
members of each company were historically appointed by the president; but in 2004, the Bush 
administration announced that it would cease appointing such members. 
 Second, the enterprises should be forced to focus more on the lower end of the housing 
market. The loan limit for a conforming mortgage might be frozen at its current level of 
$333,700 for some years. HUD might strengthen the affordable housing goals that it sets for 
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Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  Indeed, as of the fall 2004 HUD is fielding comments on 
proposed revisions to these goals that would result in a marked increase in targeted lending.   
 Third, the safety-and-soundness regime should be strengthened so that it is more comparable 
to that of the federal banking agencies.  This step should include giving OFHEO or its successor: 1) 
responsibility for the approval of new programs and other activities; 2) the discretion to set both 
minimum and risk-based capital requirements; and 3) receivership authority.  While the presence of 
a safety-and-soundness regulatory regime likely reinforces the market perception of an implied 
guarantee,  stronger oversight should serve to reduce taxpayer exposure. 
 The policy issues raised by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are complex and increasingly 
important as these institutions grow and become a more pervasive influence on the financial sector. 
Although the first-best path of privatization may well be politically unrealistic, we believe that some 
constructive second-best measures deserve serious consideration. 
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Table 1 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Assets and Mortgage-backed Securities, and the Mortgage Market 
(in billions of dollars, includes single- and multi-family mortgages) 
 
 
 
Fannie Mae 
 
Freddie Mac 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
 
Total assets 
 
 
Retained 
mortgage 
portfolioa 
 
Mortgage-
backed 
securities 
outstandingb 
 
 
 
Total assets 
 
 
Retained 
mortgage 
portfolioa 
 
Mortgage-
backed 
securities 
outstandingb 
 
Total nonfarm, 
residential 
mortgages 
1980 $57.9  $55.6  $0.0  $5.5  $5.0  $17.0  $1,105 
1985 99.1       94.1 54.6 16.6 13.5 99.9 1,730
1990 133.1       114.1 288.1 40.6 21.5 316.4 2,907
1995 316.6       252.9 513.2 137.2 107.7 459.0 3,745
2000 675.2       607.7 706.7 459.3 385.5 576.1 5,543
2001 799.9       706.8 859.0 641.1 503.8 653.1 6,110
2002 887.5       801.1 1,029.5 752.2 589.9 749.3 6,842
2003 1,009.6       901.9 1,300.2 803.4 660.4 768.9 7,715
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
 
a Includes repurchased mortgage-backed securities. 
b Excludes mortgage-backed securities that are held in portfolio 
 
Sources: OFHEO, Federal Reserve, Freddie Mac 
 
 
 
 1
Table 2 
Holders of Single-Family Residential Mortgages (Credit Exposures), 1970-2000  
 
 
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
       
Total ($ Billion) 297.8 482.0 966.2 1523.5 2619.9 3478.2 5205.4
        
Banks & Thrifts 210.0 351.8 647.4 765.5 1030.5 1128.9 1559.9
    Commercial Banks 42.9 77.8 160.1 211.2 430.3 646.5 965.6 
    Thrifts 167.1 274.0 487.3 554.3 600.2 482.4 594.2 
        
Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac 15.2 31.8 69.1 257.3 713.1 1285.5 2020.0
    Fannie Mae 15.2 25.8 51.8 145.9 385.5 733.4 1160.5
    Freddie Mac 0.0 5.9 17.3 111.4 327.6 552.1 859.5 
        
Ginnie Mae 3.3 22.3 92.3 206.7 391.5 461.4 592.6 
        
All Others (Residual) 69.4 76.2 157.5 294.0 484.8 602.4 1032.9
        
% Distribution        
        
Banks & Thrifts 70.5% 73.0% 67.0% 50.2% 39.3% 32.5% 30.0%
    Commercial Banks 14.4% 16.1% 16.6% 13.9% 16.4% 18.6% 18.6% 
    Thrifts 56.1% 56.8% 50.4% 36.4% 22.9% 13.9% 11.4% 
        
Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac 5.1% 6.6% 7.2% 16.9% 27.2% 37.0% 38.8%
     Fannie Mae 5.1% 5.4% 5.4% 9.6% 14.7% 21.1% 22.3% 
     Freddie Mac 0.0% 1.2% 1.8% 7.3% 12.5% 15.9% 16.5% 
        
Ginnie Mae 1.1% 4.6% 9.6% 13.6% 14.9% 13.3% 11.4%
        
 
 
 
 
 2
All Others 23.3% 15.8% 16.3% 19.3% 18.5% 17.3% 19.8%
 
Note:  This table indicates who owns single-family residential mortgages (and excludes any holdings of mortgage-backed securities); 
in essence, it indicates who bears the credit risks on mortgages.    Source: Federal Reserve, Fannie Mae 
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